Tywardreath Artefact & Distribution Analysis Report 2010.
 Written by Natasha Ferguson
 Centre for Battlefield Archaeology
 University of Glasgow
 Written on behalf of Mr John Andrews.
 Tywardreath Battlefield Project.
Copyright © 2010. Tywardreath Battlefield Project.



This is the first part of the Analysis. 2007/2010.

This distribution map created by Andrews extends beyond the artefact assemblage made available to the author for analysis. Therefore it is possible to understand this data within a wider landscape context, which broadens to include areas northeast of Tywardreath and the battlefield of Castle Dore itself.  The main body of material recovered by Andrews is situated in four fields directly south of the village of Tywardreath and in two larger fields positioned further south shaped by two curving lanes, Tywardreath Hill and Polpey Lane.  As previously mentioned both lanes meet at the point of pre-19th century coastline, creating a distinctive feature in the landscape.  In these fields the distribution is less concentrated but with a clear bias towards the line of hedges running to the side of Tywardreath Hill, with few artefacts plotted furthermost towards Polpey Lane.  

To the east of Tywardreath village the distribution continues to spread northeast in a wide scatter which covers approximately thirteen fields with significant concentrations of material either side of the Castle Dore Road ( Figure 4 ) 

Modern expansion of Tywardreath has clearly had an impact, creating a gap within the northwest portion of the assemblage as indicated by the dense  concentration of artefacts that still exist on the fringes of the 20th century housing estate.  This extensive artefact distribution stretching from Polmear to beyond the Castle Dore Road is now connected by only one field to the southeast corner of the housing estate, therefore if expansion was to continue the site would subsequently be divided in two.

Numerous contemporary accounts refer to the difficulty of the Cornish terrain, describing the "steepness of the hill and deepness of the ways"  ( after Ede-Borrett 2004, 107 )1, as well as the stout earth and stone Cornish hedges, many of which still survive, forming an '  enclosed country '  ( Mercurius Aulicus 1644 )2,  Symonds describes the hedges as ' cannon proof' and having "  no avenues wider then one or in some places two horse can approach at a time'  ( Symonds 1644,64 ). This landscape would undoubtedly have influenced the mode of fighting, with restricted mobility effecting the deployment of horse, foot and artillery, as well as the vital supply of food and ammunition transported by baggage train.

In such circumstances successful commanders were required to be tactically flexible, turning initial limitations of terrain to their advantage by utilising smaller units of infantry and cavalry to engage in skirmishing and ambush reacher then open warfare ( Roberts 2002,48 ).  

The influence of the landscape on military tactics is potentially reflected in the archaeological assemblage of material at Tywardreath.  Two possible patterns present themselves.  The first sits within the main body of material situated in the four fields south of the village and is defined by a series of north- south running ' Cornish ' hedges. Here the pattern of distribution is closely associated with the line of the hedges, with dense accumulations of material respecting the field boundaries and becoming less concentrated towards the middle of the fields ( Figure 5 )  this pattern of material provides strong evidence of a running fight,with bodies of foot making use of the substantial hedges as ready-made defensive breastworks to give fire with some degree of protection.  there is clear movement within this assemblage, with each side advancing or retreating to the next set of hedges,  inevitably attempting to cross the open ground of the fields as quickly as possible.  This method of fighting is well documented in contemporary sources of this campaign with references of the Parliamentarian foot lying 
 " so close under the hedges " ( Symonds 1644, 64 ) for protection and then being " forces to fight from hedge to hedge "  ( Mercurius Aulicus 1644 ), as the Royalists pushed them along ridge from Lostwithiel.

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               Moving northwards there is a second pattern of material which appears to traverse the Castle Dore Road,  with a bias in concentration towards northern fields and road to Treesmill   ( Figure 6 ) .  The Castle Dore Road runs eastward into Tywardreath and westward unto the ridge of the ring fort and the side of battlefield.  in such a restricted landscape troop movement were dependent on the narrow roads and lanes that contoured the landscape.  The strategic necessity of the roads is illustrated in a letter from Essex to Sir philip Stapleton.   Here he describes his withdrawal from lostwithiel to reach the coast being severely hindered as the roads were,  " so extreme foul with excessive rain " ( after ede-Borrett 2004, 103 ). 3
Therefore, as the roads provided the only means of efficient communication,  control of the routeways was of paramount importance to any General wishing to exert control over the enemy.  This assemblage potentially represents an attempt at maintaining control of the landscape,  as this particular site appears to be cross-road with routes running west to St Blazey, south to Polkerris and Menebilly;  east to the high ground of Castle Dore and into Golant; and finally north to Lostwithiel.  All are ports and routeways that were essential to the supply of the Parliamentarian army.   Therefore this may have been an attempt by the Royalist army to starve our Essex army,  as an anonymous Parliamentarian officer accounts,
" On Tuesday 27th  August, the Enemy, having drawn themselves off the day before about 3000 horse and foot, that partie marched towards a place called Blazey Bridge,  about three miles from Lostwithiel,  which they did to stop the passage of provision from Milly-Billy ( Menibilly ) Bay,  if they could, from coming to my Lord General;  for be taking it,  my Lord could not have provisions, but by breaking through them "  ( Parliamentary officer, after Ede-Borrett, 2004, 107 ).

Skirmishing with the enemy certainly seems to have been almost constant throughout the Lostwithiel campaign, as the same Parliamentary officer continues to describe the intensity of the situation.
"  After our horse and foot made good at Blazey bridge many days, …. Defended themselves against so many numerous companies of the Kings forces for almost 20 adieus, in continual skirmishing " ( Parliamentary officer, after Ede-Borrett, 2004, 107  ).  

It is interesting to note also that Dawson’s 1804 map depicts this area to be less enclosed than surrounding fields.  Perhaps the openness of this area and its situation on high ground was a factor in its potential selection as an effective position, possibly as a road block,  where horse and foot could be deployed (Figure 7). Does this body of material, stretching from the Castle Dore Road down along Tywardreath Hill to the former coastline at Polmear therefore represent an attempt to ‘break though’ the Royalist lines, resulting in a skirmish and rout across fields and hedges down to the sea? Here the interpretive quandary presents itself; what is the direction of travel? There is little doubt that the volume of lead projectiles recovered from this area certainly suggests intensive fighting, but where does the skirmish originate?  The topography and the patterning of lead projectiles on the Castle Dore Road would favour the fighting to have run down the ridge in the direction of the sea, as perhaps represented by the trickle of material running along the edges of Tywardreath Hill lane.  Contemporary sources suggests greater activity towards St Blazey,  therefore the action may have begun at the bottom of the ridge which encompasses Tywardreath to the southeast.
One must however consider that the geographical scales of this landscape are relatively compact and in an unfamiliar landscape certain landmarks will be used continually to describe more general areas.

                                                                                                  The Sleepy Village
More then 350 years ago, the population of Cornwall was locked in an almost continuous decade of bloodshed and violence on a scale and ferocity hitherto unknown, The English Civil war, 1642 - 1651.  Some called it the great rebellion between Parliament and the King, call it what you like, it was war, and with wars you have battlefields.
Tywardreath today is a quiet village not far from St Austell with a history that goes back to the tenth Century.  It boasts of having one of the most important Priories in Cornish history.  St Andrews Priory dates back to eleventh century.  Looking at the peaceful village today, you would never imagine it was a place that contributed to one of the bloodiest wars that England had ever seen.


                                                                                                      Stannary Parliament

Today we read from Historians that Cornwall was a Royalist County, but evidence obtained by research shows that many a Cornishman believed in the views of Parliament, surprising because Cornwall rights and privileges were tied up with the Royal Duchy, and not forgetting " Stannary Parliament ". This was a Parliament for Cornish tin miners which had powers rivalling those of the English Parliament.  King John granted a charter to the tin miners back in 1201.  This separate and powerful institutions, available to the tin miners reflected the enormous importance of the tin industry to the English economy during the middle ages.  So the Cornish saw the Civil War as a fight between England and Cornwall as much as a conflict between King and Parliament.  The English Parliament wanted to reduce the King's power, would this include the Cornish Parliament  ? 

                                                                                                    Black Powder and Guns.
The first recorded account of Black Powder used in Europe date to 1247.  This  was a statement made by Bishop Alberus in 1279 at the siege of Seville Spain.
We are of the understanding that China was the first to invented gun powder and exported it into Europe, but it was Roger Bacon that first invented/used gun powder in Europe. 1248.
Its hard to think that cannons was used in the 13th century, we think of bows and arrows and Nights with swords but the first recordings show that cannons were used against the Scots in around 1326.


The first recorded hand cannon was in 1364, this was in the reign of Edward III which transform England into the moist efficient military power in Europe. It was the beginning of the Hundred Year War, 1337 to 1453.  In 1424 saw the first mechanical hand cannon make its appearance and considered a forerunner for the handgun. The hand cannon was used until the 1520s. 
The Matchlock was the first mechanism or " Lock " invented to facilitate the firing of a hand held firearm.  This design removed the hand to lower by hand a lit match into the weapon's flash pan and made it possible to have both hands free to keep a firm grip on the weapon at the moment of firing, and more importantly, to keep both eyes on the target.

The classic European matchlock which was one of the guns used in the Civil War, held a slow burning match in a clamp at the end of a small curved leaver called, " A serpentine ".
Upon pulling the lever ( in late models called a trigger ) protruding from the bottom of the gun and connected to the serpentine, later known as a " Doghead " ( A doghead is what holds the burning fuse or flint and applies it to the gunpowder ) the clamp dropped down, lowering the slow scolding mach into the flash pan and igniting the priming powder. The flash from the primer travelled through the touch hole igniting the main charge of propellant in the the gun ball.  For safety reasons the mach/wick would be moved before reloading.  Both ends of the match/wick were usually kept alight in case one end should be accidentally extinguished.  one of the downsides of the matchlock was the weather, reloading must have been a nightmare if it was raining or if it was windy, the matchlock was also uneconomical to keep ready for long periods of time.  To maintain a single sentry of night guard duty, keeping both ends of the match lit, would require nearly a mile of match/wick per year, not only that but at night, the match would glow in the darkness, possibly revealing the musketeers position. 

Flintlock is the general term given to any firearm based on the flintlock mechanism.  The Flintlock was one of the musket used in the English Civil War.  Introduced at the beginning of the seventieth century and in services for two centuries until it was replace by the percussion cap.

It is not unusual to find parts of flint belonging to muskets after a days field walking, sometimes, complete one are found.  Sizes of flint very depending on the musket used, the common size, one inch by one half inches.