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Cornwall, in the mid-17th century, was considered a foreign land. Bound by its ancient laws and alien tongue, the Cornish were regarded as nothing more then 'poor, rough and boorish' by those beyond the River Tamar ( Stoyle 200,34 ). The Cornish maintained a distinct cultural identity and fierce independence which was fuelled by a strong desire to preserve what was lift of the Celtic tradition. As a predominately Catholic society the Cornish believed the Church of England to represent the last vestiges of the Celtic Christian tradition, something which Charles I heavily exploited in his capacity as Royal protector and defender of the true faith. Thousands flocked to join the Royalist cause, although many Cornishmen were driven by the simple instinct to expel the foreign invaders from their land rather then blind devotion to the Church and King ( Stoyle 2000, 50 ).
To the godly Parliamentarians the Cornish represented everything they despised, believed they deserved to be punished for their wicked unchristian ways. As Essex moved through this hostile Cornish landscape, he turned a blind eye to the thievery and rapine unleashed onto the local populace. This brutality, however, was not forgotten as the Cornish townsfolk who were ' roused to savage anger ', stripping naked and viciously beating hundreds of prisoners as they were led through the streets of Lostwithiel in the aftermath of the campaign ( Ede-Borrett 2004,47 ).
In the summer of 1644 Essex moved his army southwards in an attempt to gain control of the West and its valuable resources of tin and lead for Parliament. The Lostwithiel Campaign was a disaster for Essex as he continually failed to take the initiative resulting in the loss of many of his key positions, including the high ground surrounding Lostwithiel and access to the port of Fowey. The King continued to pressure Essex, expertly deploying General Lord Goring and Major General Basset with most of the Royalist horse and 1500 foot to " stop provisions at St Blazey ", which ensured Essex had no access to supply by sea or room to scavenge, for food on land ( Coate 1933, 146 ). This strategy took advantage of particularly wet and stormy tether of July and August which saw rotting crops and few sources of food to feed the starving populace, never mind the additional hungry mouths of locust like armies. As Essex's army was pushed further should his ability to gather supplies of food and ammunition were becoming severely limited, with much of his army confined within Lostwithiel. Essex was in desperate shape, writing on the 27 August 1644
" Our duty here is so great that if the enemy do not drew off or we recur succour speedily, we shall be put to great extremities, spending much ammunition and march, which we cannot afford " ( Essex, 1644 ).
By 30th August Essex realised the hopelessness of the situation and the next day withdrew his army from Lostwithiel in an attempt to evacuate by sea, in a similar vein to a 17th century version of Dunkirk, using a flotilla of boats waiting at the small ports of Polkerris, Menelbilly and Golant
( Essex ). Staying on the high ground, using the ancient road between Lostwithiel and Fowey, the Parliamentarian army move southward in a disorderly retreat, forced by heavy rain and mud soaked roads to leave most of their supplies behind them. As the Royalist officer Richard Symonds accounts in his diary;
" The enemy had left a cartload of muskets, besides many more in the dirt a little higher, 5 pieces of cannon in several places, 2 of them being very long ones" ( Symonds 1644, 63 ).
The Royalists were in hot pursuit, fighting a running battle along the ridge way and skirmishing at every opportunity with the rear guard of the Parliamentarians, responded by taking advantage of the thick earth and stone hedges which transected the ridge, using them as ready made ramparts with the foot lying " close under the hedges which are all cannon proof " ( Symonds 1644, 64 ). and therefore being able to return fire under a degree of protective cover. Despite the resolve of the Parliamentarian rear guard, this could serve only to buy time for the retreating army as the full force of the Royalist Horse and Foot pushed them along the ridge way " beating them from hedge to hedge " and " killing a great many of them "
( Symonds 1644, 63 ). Reaching the end of the ridge, Essex and his army occupied the Iron Age hillfort of Castle Dore, utilising its circular earthworks as redoubts to hold artillery at his center. in this position Essex defended his only routes of escape, which included the roads leading eastward to Golant and westward to Tywardreath and ports of Polkerris and Menabilly ( Coate 1933, 1490. Essex and the King engaged in a series of attacks and counter attacks, including a charge by Major-General Bassett's cavalry and foot on the Parliamentarian left flank, having arrived in the direction of St Blazey. This was broken by a Captain Reynolds who pushed the Royalists back over several fields, until they were dispersed by another wave of Royalist horse ( Homes 1989, 61 ). The fighting continued over many hours, until cracks began to show in the Parliamentary command.
In the early hours of the next morning Essex and many of his officers escaped by boat to Plymouth leaving his broken army in the field. As word spread of his hasty departure the army eventually began to crumble away.
The first to abscond was Colonel Weare's regiment on the left flank, leaving the road to Golant exposed. General Skippon was charged with surrendering to the King and did so in good order, with his officers allowed to retain their weapons as they were escorted from Cornwall. A shrewd rather then merciful move by Charles, as taking prisoners in a land of few resources would not have been an economical approach ( Purkiss 2006, 366 ).
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